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Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is a technology that is used to study the 
function of the brain. It has been suggested that fMRI could be utilised as a lie detection 
device. However, many believe that the admittance of fMRI lie detection evidence into the 
courtroom would be premature, as it is feared that the evidence could have a very persuasive 
effect on jurors. The current study assessed the veracity of these beliefs and explored whether 
this effect is more prominent amongst juries or individual jurors. Individual verdicts were 
found to differ from group verdicts. Yet both on an individual and a collaborative basis, 
jurors favoured acquittal when presented with fMRI evidence, compared to other forms of 
lie detection evidence.
Keywords: fMRI, scientific evidence, cultivation theory
The last 30 years has been described by some as a “technology revolution” 
(Silberglitt, Anton, Howell, Wong, & Gassman, 2002, p. 2). This period has seen huge 
scientific and technological growth (Shelton, Kim, & Barack, 2007). Scientific growth has 
led to the development of technology which has the ability to assist in criminal investiga-
tions. This technology has given police the ability to analyse DNA evidence and allegedly 
detect lies, both factors which are pivotal in ascertaining innocence and guilt. The wide-
spread use of these techniques has led to scientific evidence becoming ubiquitous within 
the courtroom (Gross, 1991). Due to the complexity of the scientific evidence now used in 
the courtroom, it often is presented by expert witnesses whose role is to inform the jury of 
the complex procedures used to gather and evaluate scientific evidence and to provide their 
interpretation of the findings (Devine, Clayton, Dunford, Seying, & Pryce, 2001; Zeedyk & 
Raitt, 1998). Expert witnesses can provide testimony on a wide range of evidence such as 
DNA, ballistic tests, and the analysis of lie detection data.
However, despite their inclusion in approximately 56% of criminal trials, there is 
still contention over whether juries fully understand the application and indeed the limits 
of complex scientific evidence (Hans, 2007; Sonenshein & Fitzpatrick, 2013). While con-
cerns continue to surround the accuracy and reliability of the techniques used to gather 
the scientific data, concerns have begun to be raised regarding the influence that the mere 
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presence of scientific evidence may have on potential jurors (Baertschi, 2011; Stern, 2002; 
Wolpe, Foster, & Langleben, 2005).
Serious questions have been raised regarding juror’s competency and ability to un-
derstand expert scientific testimony (Honess & Charman, 2002; Penrod, Bornstein, Nemeth, 
& McAuliff, 2003). The implied certainty and authority of science can prove particularly 
prejudicial to jurors (Wolpe et al, 2005). The white coat effect refers to when jurors base 
their evaluation of the evidence on heuristic cues or cognitive short cuts associated with the 
expert witness, such as their presentation, demeanour and credentials (Kovera, McAuliff, & 
Herbert, 1999). This effect is particularly prominent when the evidence being presented is 
highly complex resulting in jurors becoming confused and thus relying upon heuristic cues 
(Cooper, Bennett, & Sukel, 1996; Lieberman, Carrell, Miethe, & Krauss, 2008). Indeed, it 
even has been suggested that certain forms of scientific evidence could themselves be con-
sidered as cognitive short cuts. For example, the popularity of fictional crime dramas and 
high profile news stories possibly is believed to have created preconceived beliefs amongst 
jurors regarding the reliability of certain forms of forensic evidence, particularly DNA 
evidence, which erroneously is perceived by jurors to be 95% accurate (Lieberman et al., 
2008). Researchers argue that the ubiquitous presence of DNA evidence in popular media 
has led to it gaining a “special aura of certainty” and “mystic infallibility” that has resulted 
in its very presence becoming a heuristic cue for jurors, who have come to view DNA evi-
dence as a definitive indicator of guilt (Lieberman et al., 2008, p. 32).
In recent years, similar technologies have emerged in the courtroom which also 
might gain a comparable level of perceived authority due to their scientific rigour, per-
ceived accuracy and biological foundations (McCabe, Castel, & Rhodes, 2011). For exam-
ple, fMRI now is being regarded as a form of lie-detection technology (Ogawa, Lee, Kay, & 
Tank, 1990). It has been developed to fulfil the demand for an objective lie-detection meas-
ure, driven in part by increasing concerns surrounding international security (Langleben, 
2008; Wolpe et al., 2005). In the context of lie detection, fMRI is used to identify specific 
brain regions that are associated with effort or conflict. These brain regions are believed 
to be activated significantly during deception (Kozel, Johnson, Mu, Grenesko, Laken, & 
George, 2005). It is alleged that fMRI can identify lies with an accuracy ranging from 86 
to 90% (Simpson, 2008). However, others argue that these estimates are overly optimistic 
and believe that the implementation of the current technology in a legal setting would be 
premature (Ford, 2006).
Indeed, Baertschi (2011) suggests that if fMRI lie detection evidence is permitted 
into the courtroom it could have a very persuasive and damaging effect on jurors. These 
concerns seem to be supported by a number of studies, which indicate that neuroimaging 
techniques, such as fMRI, already possess an “aura of certainty” (Lieberman et al., 2008, p. 32) in 
the eyes of jurors. Gurley and Marcus (2008) found that when testimony was accompanied 
by an image of a brain scan, the number of not guilty by reason of insanity verdicts almost 
doubled (19% vs. 37%). The authors argue that these results do not prove that jurors are 
influenced unduly by fMRI evidence. They suggest that, instead, fMRI may be providing 
jurors with the information they require to establish a correct verdict.
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However, several studies have demonstrated that this overly optimistic stance is 
not justified (Racine, Bar-Ilan, & Illes, 2005). Weisberg, Keil, Goldstein, Rawson and Gray 
(2008) have shown that the addition of neuroscience data can not only increase confidence 
in good explanations, but also can transform bad explanations into good ones. Similarly, 
McCabe and Castel (2008) reported that subjects were more likely to deem the scientific 
reasoning of cognitive neuroscience studies as valid when the study was presented along-
side brain images, rather than other images. Both of these studies highlight how the author-
ity of science and brain images can mislead an uninformed public (Baertschi, 2011).
The potential influence of neuroimaging evidence over other scientific techniques 
was further reinforced by McCabe and colleagues (2011), who found fMRI to be signifi-
cantly more influential than alternative forms of lie-detection evidence, such as the poly-
graph. In their study they found that over 75% of participants in the fMRI condition reached 
a guilty verdict compared to only about 45% of participants in the polygraph condition. The 
researchers suggest that this is due to fMRI providing a more explicit link between biology 
and behaviour than other lie detection technologies (McCabe et al., 2011).
How juries incorporate scientific evidence into their decisions
The presence of scientific evidence in a trial is only one factor in the complex 
process of jury decision making. How the evidence is perceived by the individual juror 
and subsequently reviewed in the deliberation process also can impact greatly the jury’s 
final decision. One of the most prominent cognitive models of jury decision making is 
Pennington and Hastie’s (1992) Story Model, which suggests that jurors incorporate trial 
information into one or more plausible stories. The story with the most plausible, support-
ing evidence is retained and informs the juror’s final verdict. Crucially, these stories are not 
based solely on the evidence presented, but also reflect jurors’ attitudes and experiences. 
These attitudes are formed primarily by previous exposure to and the perceived authority 
of the evidence presented.
According to Cultivation Theory, media exposure can influence perceptions of so-
cial reality (Gerbner, 1998). Research has shown that heavy television viewing can influ-
ence people’s views on social issues such as age, gender and politics. Individuals, who 
are exposed to a lot of television tend to glean their conceptions about the world from the 
media. Thus, these individuals often possess views that reflect more of a television reality 
rather than a social reality (Hayes-Smith & Levett, 2011). The CSI Effect refers to the phe-
nomenon by which television crime shows, like CSI, cultivate and shape people’s percep-
tions of social reality in terms of forensic evidence (Hayes-Smith & Levett, 2011). It could, 
therefore, be seen as a genre-specific version of the broader Cultivation Effect. Schweitzer 
and Saks (2007) identified two possibilities for how the CSI Effect could affect trial judge-
ments. One possibility posits that the effect adds to the burdens of the prosecution, and the 
other asserts that it adds to the burdens of the defence.
The pro-prosecution theory suggests that if forensic evidence is present, jurors who 
watch crime dramas may focus predominantly on the forensic evidence, giving it more 
weight than the other evidence and increasing the likelihood of a guilty verdict. The pro-
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defence theory states that if forensic evidence is absent, it may cause jurors who watch 
crime dramas to be skeptical of testimony or other common trial evidence. Thus, jurors will 
be more likely to acquit the defendant.
The potential impact of perceived authority and media exposure is dependent upon 
juror competency, which plays an important role in the decisionmaking process. The extent 
to which the juror understands the evidence determines how likely they are to fully appraise 
and scrutinise the evidence through systematic processing (Chaiken & Maheswaran, 1994) 
or simply resort to heuristic cues (McCoy, Nuñez, & Dammeyer, 1999). Two models have 
been identified which represent the contrasting extremes of a competence-related continu-
um. The Satisficing Model is at the low performance end of the continuum. At the satisfic-
ing end of the continuum, only a single plausible story is constructed from the evidence. 
Discrepant evidence or alternative possibilities fail to be acknowledged and the verdict is 
considered the most satisfactory match. At the other end of the continuum is a model of 
optimum performance known as the Theory-Evidence Co-Ordination Model. The Theory-
Evidence Co-Ordination model of processing involves the construction of multiples stories. 
In order to reach a verdict, each story must be evaluated against the evidence and against 
the alternatives. The verdict that has the most consistent and least discrepant evidence as-
sociated with it will be chosen (Kuhn, Weinstock, & Flaton 1994).
It is evident, therefore, that on an individual basis, the presentation of scientific 
evidence can be problematic due to its reliance upon individuals’ diverse levels of com-
petence. The potential negative impact of individual competence can be offset by em-
ploying groups, which are considered to possess collective superior reasoning skills and 
competency (McCoy et al., 1999). This is because groups are more likely to employ the 
more complex Theory-Evidence Co- ordination Model described above (Kuhn et al., 1994). 
More specifically, due to the average collective recall of the jury being superior to that of 
individual jurors, more evidence will be recalled and, therefore, available for consideration 
during the deliberation process (Kalven & Zeisel, 1966). This then increases the chance of 
alternative theories being discussed, which in turn increases the likelihood that jurors will 
engage in systematic rather than heuristic processing. In addition, there is evidence that 
jury deliberation can eliminate other biases such as situational biases, personal biases, and 
source monitoring errors (Kaplan & Miller, 1978; Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994). These findings 
support the theory that juries may give more accurate weight to expert scientific evidence 
than individual jurors.
However, not all evidence suggests that groups are less biased in decision making 
than individuals. Social influences sometimes can jeopardise higher-order reasoning, limit-
ing the consideration of alternative theories or scenarios. Steiner (1972, as cited by Nuñez, 
McCrea, & Culhane, 2011) argues that the emergence of Social Loafing and the associated 
diffusion of individual responsibility can lead to vital information not being considered 
and a failure to engage in systematic processing (Stasser & Tittus, 1985). Similarly, Group 
Polarisation Effects often result in prior individual biases being amplified within the group 
(Isenberg, 1986). For example, the verdict preference initially held by the majority has been 
shown to accurately predict the final verdict in 90% of cases and will often prevail even if it 
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is incorrect (Sandys & Dillehay, 1995). We can see, therefore, why any preconceived ideas 
relating to scientific evidence could be highly problematic due to the potential exacerbation 
of biases that can occur during deliberation.
The Current Study
The current study is a pilot project that will provide a basis and foundation for future 
research. A pilot project was considered due to the novel nature of the research. Existing re-
search in the field suggests that scientific evidence can be highly persuasive and potentially 
problematic for jurors (Gurley & Marcus, 2008; Weisberg et al., 2008). Its complexity and 
scientific prowess gaining scientific evidence an ‘aura of certainty’ and ‘mystic fallibility’ 
that could, potentially, nullify a juror’s role in the decision-making process (Lieberman et 
al., 2008, p. 32). These concerns highlight the need for further research regarding juror per-
ceptions of emerging scientific techniques such as fMRI. fMRI, although a relatively new 
technology, already appears to be developing its own “aura of certainty” (Lieberman et al., 
2008. p. 32), with previous research demonstrating its perceived authority and influence 
over potential jurors (McCabe et al., 2011). However, some researchers argue that much 
of the existing literature regarding jury decision making, including that of fMRI, may not 
reflect real case outcomes. This is because, despite evidence that group decisions can dif-
fer from individual decisions by either exacerbating or eliminating biases, the majority of 
jury research to date has been conducted on the juror level and only extrapolated to the jury 
(Nuñez et al., 2011).The current study will address this gap in the literature by examining 
the influence of different forms of lie detection evidence, including fMRI, on individual 
juror and group verdicts. Verdict preference will be recorded at three time points during the 
study: individually prior to deliberation, as a group following deliberation and individually 
following deliberation. It was hypothesised that the type of lie detection evidence would 
impact upon both individual and group verdicts, with fMRI evidence yielding the largest 
number of guilty verdicts. In line with Kuhn and colleagues’ (1994) model it was thought 
that group deliberations may eliminate biases in terms of lie detection evidence, and it was 
thus predicted that there would be a significant difference between the number of guilty 
verdicts in the pre-deliberation condition and the number of guilty verdicts in the individual 
post-deliberation condition. It was hypothesised that the number of guilty verdicts would 
be reduced, following group deliberation, as a result of jurors adopting a more sophisticated 
decision-making model.
METHOD
Participants
Thirty-two participants took part in the research. The participants were Teesside 
University students. University students were recruited through the SONA system. SONA 
is an internal computer system used by the University that allows students to sign up for 
research. The system records students’ participation and rewards course credit accordingly 
(60 minutes). In order to take part in the research, participants had to be eligible for jury 
service in the UK. Hence all participants fulfilled the following criteria: being between the 
ages of 18 and 70 years old; being listed on the electoral register; having lived in the UK 
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for any period of at least five years since the age of 13; having never had a prison or youth 
custody sentence of more than five years; having never been in prison or youth custody for 
any length of time in the past 10 years; and having never had a mental health condition or 
mental disability.
Materials
Case vignette. The vignette used in this study was a hard copy of the abridged ver-
sion of the vignette created by Kassin and Sommers (1997). The abridged version was first 
utilised in the pioneering study by McCabe and colleagues (2011).The vignette describes 
a case in which a defendant is accused of killing his estranged wife and her lover. The 
vignette was designed so that the prosecutor’s evidence appeared “, incomplete, ambigu-
ous and circumstantial” (Kassin & Sommers, 1997). Thus, reasonable doubt can be cast 
over the defendant’s guilt. The vignette is compiled of 15 discrete points of evidence, each 
of which is numbered. The experimental manipulation involved differences in point 8 of 
the vignette. The experimental manipulation refers to the differences in the case vignettes 
across the three evidence conditions. In the control condition, point 8 stated that the second 
prosecution witness could not testify.
The next witness, Dr. Ronald Tinsworth, did not testify because of a family 
emergency, which was confirmed by court personnel.
In the fMRI condition, point 8 was the prosecution witnesses’ expert testimony. The 
testimony (point 8) is presented below:
The next witness, Dr. Ronald Tinsworth, had recorded images of Givens’ brain 
activity using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while he 
was being interrogated by police. According to Tinsworth, there was in-
creased activation of frontal brain areas when Givens denied killing his wife 
and neighbour, as compared to when he truthfully answered questions about 
things like his date of birth, or home address (this is shown in the figure to 
the right). Similar increases in frontal brain activity are known to occur when 
people are lying.
In the polygraph condition, point 8 was the prosecution witnesses’ expert testimony. 
The testimony (point 8) is presented below:
The next witness, Dr. Ronald Tinsworth, had recorded Givens’ physiologi-
cal responses using a polygraph machine while he was being interrogated 
by police. According to Tinsworth, there was increased physiological activity 
when Givens denied killing his wife and neighbour, as compared to when he 
truthfully answered questions about things like his date of birth or home 
address. Similar increases in physiological activity are known to occur when 
people are lying.
Verdict/response sheets. All of the response sheets had two boxes (guilty/not 
guilty). Participants were instructed to select one box. The response sheet for the post-
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deliberation individual verdict differed slightly as it included a question regarding partici-
pant’s motivation to alter their initial verdict following deliberation with the group.
Procedure
First participants were randomly allocated to one of the three evidence conditions 
(control, fMRI, or polygraph). Participant’s verdict responses were measured at three time 
points. Each participant was presented with the case vignette containing the experimen-
tal manipulation. After reading the case vignette, each participant completed a response 
sheet providing an individual initial verdict of guilty or not guilty. Following the initial 
verdict participants were asked to deliberate in groups comprising of between two and six 
participants, all of whom were in the same experimental condition (for up to 60 minutes). 
Participants were instructed to reach a unanimous verdict. The deliberation process took 
place in absence of the researcher. As a group, the participants were required to complete 
another response sheet recording their group verdict. Following the group verdict, each 
participant was required to complete another response sheet detailing their final individual 
verdict preference. If this final verdict differed from that of the group, participants were 
instructed to provide details as to why they altered their decision.
Finally, participants were instructed to read a debrief form and asked to share any 
queries or concerns they may have with the researcher.
RESULTS
Examining the effect of evidence type on individual juror decisions (pre-deliberation)
In order to examine the effect of evidence type on individual juror decisions, ver-
dicts first  were recorded prior to any deliberation taking place. An exact chi-square analy-
sis revealed that the type of evidence presented did not significantly affect the number of 
guilty verdicts: χ2 (2, N=32)=2.15, p=0.37 (Table 1).
Examining the effect of evidence type on group decisions (post-deliberation)
An exact chi-square analysis revealed that number of guilty verdicts did differ sig-
nificantly according to evidence condition: χ2 (2, N=32)=8.94, p=0.01 (Table 1), with the 
polygraph condition yielding the most guilty verdicts and the fMRI condition the least.
Examining the effect of evidence type on individual juror decisions (post-deliberation)
An exact chi-square analysis revealed that whether participants found the defend-
ant guilty did not significantly differ by the evidence condition: χ2 (2, N=32)=5.50, p=0.07 
(Table 1).
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Table 1:
Comparison of Verdicts Across the Three Evidence Conditions
fMRI Polygraph Control
Pre- deliberation
Guilty 33% 64% 44%
Not Guilty 67% 36% 56%
Post- deliberation Group
Guilty 17% 73% 22%
Not Guilty 83% 27% 78%
Post- deliberation Individual
Guilty 17% 64% 33%
Not Guilty 83% 36% 67%
Examining the effect of group deliberation on individual verdict preference
A McNemar test using binomial distribution was used to examine whether indi-
vidual pre- deliberation verdicts differed from individual post-deliberation verdicts. The 
McNemar test did not show a significant difference in the number of guilty verdicts be-
tween the pre-deliberation condition and the individual post-deliberation condition (N=32, 
exact p=0.25) (Table 2).
Table 2:
Comparison of Pre-Deliberation and Post-Deliberation Verdicts
Guilty Not Guilty
Pre-Deliberation 47% 53%
Individual
Verdict
Post-Deliberation 38% 62%
Individual
Verdict
Results summary
A significant association between the number of guilty verdicts and the type of evi-
dence only was found in the group post-deliberation condition, with 73% of participants 
in the polygraph condition, 22% in the control condition and 17% in the fMRI condition 
reaching a guilty verdict. No significant effect of evidence type was found in either the 
individual pre-deliberation or individual post-deliberation conditions. There was also no 
significant difference found between the number of guilty verdicts in the individual pre-
deliberation condition and the individual post-deliberation condition.
DISCUSSION
The current study examined the influence of fMRI lie detection evidence on jury de-
cision making. Unlike previous research that mainly has examined individual juror verdicts 
in response to scientific evidence, the current study investigated the influence of neuroim-
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aging evidence following post-trial deliberations. Hence, the emphasis of the study was 
not only on the influence of the fMRI evidence, but also the dynamics and effects of the 
deliberation process when considering fMRI evidence.
Examining the effect of deliberation on individual verdict preferences
It was hypothesised that the number of guilty verdicts in the pre-deliberation condi-
tion would be significantly different from the number of guilty verdicts in the individual 
post- deliberation condition. It was thought that the number of guilty verdicts would de-
crease following group deliberation, as biases and heuristic cues associated with the lie de-
tection evidence would be eliminated. Previous research has shown that juror biases can be 
reduced as a result of group deliberation (Kaplan & Miller, 1978; Kerwin & Shaffer, 1994). 
However, in the current study, deliberations did not appear to alter individual juror’s verdict 
preferences. Three explanations potentially can account for these findings. The first is that 
individual jurors already may have been utilising systematic processing prior to delibera-
tion; the second explanation is that no bias exists in terms of lie detection evidence. The 
third is that engaging in group deliberations does not guarantee that individuals will adopt a 
different decision-making model that does not rely on heuristic processing.
However, the first two explanations are precluded by other findings in the current 
study where it was found that there was a significant association between the number of 
guilty verdicts and the type of lie detection evidence. While this indicates that there is some 
form of bias associated with lie detection evidence, this effect only was observed in the 
group post- deliberation condition. There was no significant association between the num-
ber of guilty verdicts and the type of evidence in either the pre-deliberation or the individual 
post-deliberation condition. These results indicate that different mechanisms underlie indi-
vidual and group verdicts.
There are a number of different theories that account for the variation between in-
dividual and group verdicts as found in the current study. According to Kuhn and his col-
leagues (1994), juries are more likely than individual jurors to utilise the highly sophisticated 
Theory-Evidence Co-Ordination Model. The model asserts that during group deliberations, 
more evidence is available for consideration (Kalvin & Zeisel, 1966), resulting in alterna-
tive stories and scenarios being discussed. Prior to deliberation, some jurors potentially 
could have either forgotten or failed to consider the lie detection evidence. Deliberations 
could have rectified this. Deeper consideration of the lie detection evidence could have lead 
jurors to alter their initial verdict, resulting in a significant association between the number 
of guilty verdicts and the evidence condition. However, this model fails to account for the 
lack of association observed in the individual post-deliberation condition. If deliberations 
had succeeded in every juror employing the Theory-Evidence Co-Ordination Model, the 
effect of evidence should not have differed between the group post-deliberation verdict and 
the individual post-deliberation verdict.
This difference could be accounted for by social influence. Group Polarisation is 
a phenomenon whereby groups adopt a more extreme position in line with the views they 
had held prior to deliberation (Isenberg, 1986). Potentially this could result in increasing the 
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strength of the association between the number of guilty verdicts and the type of evidence, 
following deliberations. There are three ways in which group polarisation could have oc-
curred: through the transfer of information, confidence and corroboration, or conformity 
(Sunstein, 2007). The results of the current study suggest that a number of participants 
sought conformity with the group in order to avoid conflict. This is illustrated by the fact 
that a significant effect only was observed in the group deliberation condition. If group de-
liberation had succeeded in altering a juror’s verdict preference and them having adopted 
a different decision making process, there should have been a significant effect in the post-
deliberation individual verdict. However, instead the post-deliberation individual verdict 
closely reflected the pre-deliberation individual verdict. This suggests that during group 
deliberation, social influence and social dynamic within the group is highly influential.
Comparing the impact of different scientific evidence on guilty verdicts
Although a significant association was found between the number of guilty verdicts 
and the type of evidence presented, the effect did not occur in the expected direction. In the 
current study, the polygraph evidence condition had the highest number of guilty verdicts, 
while the fMRI condition had the least. This is contrary to previous research, which has 
shown neuroimaging evidence, in particular fMRI evidence, to have a very persuasive ef-
fect on jurors and polygraph evidence to have little influence (McCabe et al., 2011; Myers, 
Latter, & Abdollahi-Arena, 2006). The results of the current study potentially could be 
accounted for by a lack of knowledge. Participants in the study may have possessed little 
knowledge regarding fMRI lie detection technology as it is a highly complex piece of sci-
entific apparatus that has not been publicised highly within the UK. It has been found in pre-
vious research that participants, who reported being unfamiliar with forensic procedures, 
reported also being less confident in their judgements regarding forensic evidence (Smith, 
Patry, & Stinson, 2007). Individuals who are less confident in their understanding of the 
evidence may have more reasonable doubt, resulting in fewer convictions as demonstrated 
in the current study.
It is possible that cultural differences in how scientific evidence is portrayed and 
understood could account for the contrast between the results of the current study and pre-
vious research findings. Previous fMRI research largely has been conducted in the U.S. 
According to the Story Model (Pennington & Hastie, 1992), when deciding upon a verdict, 
jurors incorporate their own attitudes and experiences along with the case information. 
There are significant differences between the US and UK in relation to media depictions 
and portrayals of lie detection technology. In the US, this technology has received consider-
able exposure in popular media, often exaggerating the current state of the technology and 
its application (Wolpe et al., 2005).
For example, No Lie MRI is an American-based company that markets and sells 
fMRI lie- detection tests. The company proclaims that the technology is “the first and only 
direct measure of truth verification and lie detection in human history” (No Lie MRI, 2006). 
The company has had widespread press exposure. Within the US, there have been numerous 
news reports, documentaries, newspaper articles, magazine articles, and radio reports about 
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the company and fMRI technology. In contrast, within the UK, news reports and articles 
have been rare and reportage is comparatively neutral (“International Press Coverage,” 2006) 
Hence, people living in the US are more likely to have been exposed to positive 
media portrayals of fMRI lie detection technology and, according to Cultivation Theory 
(Gerbner, 1998), are more likely to possess schemas which reflect the media’s overly opti-
mistic stance. Individuals who have this schema are more likely to view fMRI lie detection 
evidence as reliable, giving it more weight than is warranted. These individuals are, there-
fore, more likely to reach a guilty verdict than those who do not possess this schema or bias. 
Individuals living in England are unlikely to possess this schema due to the lack of media 
attention fMRI lie detection technology has received. Due to the lack of media exposure, it 
is highly likely that the majority of people residing in England will have very little, if any, 
knowledge regarding fMRI lie detection technology. Thus, this could account for the high 
acquittal rate in the current study.
Conversely, individuals from the UK are more likely to be familiar with the poly-
graph than with fMRI lie detection technology. Polygraph testing is available widely across 
the UK, with major test centres in London, Manchester and Birmingham (“Polygraph 
Detector Testing,” n.d.). The technology is also frequently in the media. Television talk 
shows, such as Jeremy Kyle and Trisha Goddard, often utilise the polygraph, but never 
are questions raised over the reliability of the device. This could account for the high per-
centage of guilty verdicts, observed in the current study, when polygraph evidence was 
presented. Participants may have viewed the lie detection evidence as more reliable than it 
is due to the media failing to identify the shortcomings of the technology. Again this could 
be considered an example of how television can potentially shape and cultivate percep-
tions of social reality. The British media appear to be creating a “special aura of certainty” 
(Lieberman et al., 2008, p. 32) in terms of the polygraph, similar to that which surrounds 
DNA evidence. Popular television programmes in the US also utilise the polygraph. Yet 
previous studies, such as the recent study conducted by McCabe et al (2011), found poly-
graph evidence to have little influence on juror verdicts. This could be due to television 
advertisings in the US advocating the use of fMRI. Companies advocating the use of fMRI 
technology inevitably will emphasise the limitations of the polygraph (“Polygraph Detector 
Testing”, n.d.). Hence, these companies almost can be seen as assuming the role that an ex-
pert witness would have in court, albeit in an attempt to market their own product. In court, 
when scientific expert evidence is contradicted by an opposing expert, it is often considered 
by the jury as less influential (Greene, Johns, & Bowman, 1999). When fMRI companies 
are criticising the polygraph, this could potentially be altering, in a similar way to an oppos-
ing expert witness, individuals’ perceptions of the technology, perceptions which may have 
been forged by television talk shows and other fictional dramas.
Limitations of the current study
As with any experimental study that attempts to emulate a complex real-life set-
ting, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of the current study when interpreting 
the findings.
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Researchers are unable to examine the decision-making process of real jurors decid-
ing on real cases. Hence, the use of artificial decision-making tasks is required. However, 
this leads to issues when attempting to generalise the findings to real juries (Smith, Bull, 
& Holliday, 2011). The limitations of the current study are associated largely with the par-
ticipant population, which was comprised almost entirely of University students. It is ar-
gued that student samples do not reflect actual jury pools as typically jury panels consist 
predominantly of community members (Fox, Wingrove, & Pfeifer, 2011). University stu-
dents are claimed to differ from community samples in terms of age, education and marital 
status (Nuñez, Dahl, Tang, & Jensen, 2007). Despite these claims, an extensive review of 
the literature conducted by Bornstein (1999), found few differences between community 
and student samples. The sample size also may be considered as a limitation of the current. 
However, it is important to note that the study is a pilot project and provides a foundation 
for future research.
Future research directions
The current study is one of the first to directly compare the impact of fMRI and 
polygraph evidence on jury decision making. The results of the study largely contradict 
existing research, with the presentation of polygraph evidence resulting in a higher percent-
age of guilty verdicts than the presentation of fMRI evidence. It was suggested that juror’s 
lack of familiarity in terms of fMRI could account for juror’s largely favouring acquittal 
when this form of lie detection evidence is presented. This explanation potentially could 
prove to be an important avenue for future research. If the assumptions put forward by the 
current study are correct, it suggests that jurors may lack the ability to reason effectively 
about complex scientific evidence, evidence that may potentially be pivotal in establishing 
innocence or guilt. It is thus recommended that future research include a measure of jurors’ 
understanding and awareness of different forms of lie detection technology.
The high conviction rates recorded with the presentation of polygraph evidence is 
an area that equally warrants further investigation. The findings of the current study suggest 
that the polygraph may have developed a special “aura of certainty” and “mystic fallibility” 
(Lieberman et al., 2008, p. 32), resulting in the polygraph itself having become a heuristic 
cue for jurors. It is proposed that such beliefs could stem from the media’s portrayal of 
polygraph evidence. An important area for future research should be to explore how and if 
the media influences perceptions of lie detection evidence. It is essential to establish what 
knowledge individuals are gleaning from television, as if the assumptions put forward by 
the current study are correct, the media potentially could be having a huge impact on jury 
verdicts, creating significant biases. Hence, a possible and important area for future re-
search could be the inclusion of a media exposure measure.
Another important element of the current study was the recording of verdicts at 
three separate time points. This allowed insight into the deliberation process which largely 
has been absent from previous jury decision-making studies. The current study found that 
individual juror verdicts can differ from group verdicts, and this was thought to be the result 
of social conformity. In order to closely emulate the decision-making process that occurs 
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in a real-life setting, it is thus recommended that future research should avoid examining 
individual juror judgements.
Conclusion
The current study was one of the first to explore the influence of fMRI lie detection 
evidence on jury decision making. It measured juror verdicts at three separate time points, 
a different approach to that often used within previous jury decision-making research. A 
significant effect in terms of the type evidence presented only was found in the group de-
liberation condition, suggesting that individual and group verdicts do differ. The findings 
of the current study indicate that this difference is largely the result of social influence. The 
study also found that the participants presented with the fMRI evidence largely favoured 
acquittal whilst those presented with polygraph evidence tended to favour conviction. Two 
explanations were provided to account for these findings. Ultimately, both explanations 
centre upon juror’s lack of understanding in terms of complex scientific evidence. The first 
relates to an unwillingness to convict based upon a lack of understanding, and the second 
relates to reliance upon the media to provide the knowledge and understanding required 
to reach a verdict. The two explanations proposed by the paper suggest that jurors require 
additional training or information to allow them to reason about expert scientific evidence 
effectively. Although, it is beyond the scope of this paper to determine which of the two of 
the explanations is correct, the research has made a valuable contribution to the field of jury 
decision making and has provided a number of avenues for future research.
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